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THe aUSTraLian ConTeXT 
In November 2011, Australia adopted a highly innovative, ambitious and 
comprehensive climate change policy, the Clean Energy Legislative Pack-
age (CELP). This outcome was not self-evident. Australia is a small, high 
growth, open, emissions intensive economy; and resource extraction and 
industry play an important economic and political role. At the same time, 
among developed countries, Australia’s wealth and particular exposure to 
climate change should create a context conducive to action. 
BarrierS anD DriVerS To aDopTion 
From roughly 2006 to late 2009, the Australian public was highly support-
ive of climate change policy. Climate change policy seems to have been an 
important factor in the last two federal elections. From late 2009, public 
support for climate change policy started to wane on the back of the dis-
appointing outcome of Copenhagen, the global financial crisis, the break-
ing of the so-called Millennium drought in Australia in 2009-2012, and the 
increasingly divided partisan discourse on climate change. However, in 
the August 2010 federal election, Australia’s hybrid electoral system in the 
House of Representatives (preferential voting) contributed to an unusual 
outcome, making it possible for a multiparty climate change policy pack-
age to be developed between the minority Labour Government, the Green 
Party and the three Independents. 
approaCH To enSUring poLiCY SUSTainaBiLiTY anD iMproVing 
eConoMiC eFFiCienCY 
The CELP embeds an innovative carbon pricing mechanism in a com-
prehensive and highly generous package of complementary measures 
designed to increase its public acceptability, and environmental and 
economic efficiency. It is combined with progressive income tax cuts, 
increases in government transfer payments, and measures to shield emis-
sions and trade-intensive industry and promote investment in renewable 
energy, energy efficiency and R&D. In addition, the package contains 
innovative governance mechanisms to shield it from the vagaries of the 
political cycle, and increase the political and administrative costs of dis-
mantling it. In all, these measures increase the CELP’s chances of survival 
and provide an example of policy innovation for other countries to follow, 
keeping in mind their particular national circumstances. 
Copyright © 2012 IDDRI
As a foundation of public utility, IDDRI encour-
ages reproduction and communication of its copy-
righted materials to the public, with proper credit 
(bibliographical reference and/or corresponding 
URL), for personal, corporate or public policy 
research, or educational purposes. However, 
IDDRI’s copyrighted materials are not for commer-
cial use or dissemination (print or electronic).
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the findings, 
interpretations, and conclusions expressed in the 
materials are those of the various authors and are 
not necessarily those of IDDRI’s board.
Citation: Spencer, T., Sénit, C.-A., Drutschinin, 
A., The Political Economy of Australia’s Climate 
Change and Clean Energy Legislation: Lessons Learned, 
Working Paper N°21/12, IDDRI, Paris, France, 22 p.
◖◖◖
For more information about this document,
please contact the authors:
Thomas Spencer – thomas.spencer@iddri.org
Carole-Anne Sénit – caroleanne.senit@iddri.org
ISSN 2258-7071
Idées pour Le débAT 05/2011 3IddrI
LIsT of TAbLes  4
LIsT of fIgures  4
1. INTroducTIoN  5
2. THe coNTeXT for  
THe CLEAN ENERGY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE  5
 2.1. The Australian economy and energy sector  5
 2.2. The political and social context  6
3. suMMArIZINg THe poLITIcAL ecoNoMY bArrIers  
To cArboN prIcINg ANd THe AusTrALIAN ApproAcH  
IN respoNse  11
4. THe cLeAN eNergY LegIsLATIVe pAcKAge: desIgNINg 
susTAINAbLe poLIcY  12
 4.1. Governance between flexibility and certainty  12
 4.2. Supporting emissions intensive, trade exposed 
industries and investing in clean technology  14
 4.3. Supporting households  16
coNcLusIoNs ANd LessoNs LeArNed  17
refereNces  19
INTerVIews 20
The political economy of 
Australia’s climate change 
and clean energy
legislation: lessons learned
Thomas Spencer,  
Carole-Anne Sénit (IDDRI),  
Anna Drutschinin (Sciences Po)
LIsT of TAbLes 
Table 1. Evolution of voting for the Australian Greens in federal elections, 
 House of Representatives, 2001-2010 11
Table 2. Results of the House of Representatives election in the Division of Melbourne, 2010 11
Table 3. free allocation methodology in the Australian ETS and the EU ETS 15
Table 4. Total fiscal impacts of the Clean Energy Legislative Package in million AUD 17
LIsT of fIgures 
Figure 1. Sectoral breakdown of Australian GVA, financial year 2010-2011 7
Figure 2. Australian attitudes to domestic climate policy 2006-2012 8
Figure 3. Governance structure of the Australian carbon pricing mechanism 14
Figure 4. Total income tax cut in AUD per income bracket, 2012-2015. 16
The political economy of Australia’s climate change and clean energy legislation: lessons learned
working pAper 21/2012 5IddrI
1. INTroducTIoN 
Australia is the world’s 16th largest contributor to 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (UN data), 
and has the 9th highest per capita emissions in the 
world (World Bank data). Between 1990 and 2010, 
Australia’s emissions increased by 29.8% from 418 
million tons (Mt) of CO2-e to 542.7 Mt,1 excluding 
the land-use sector (UNFCCC data). Australia’s 
abundance of coal and other raw materials, such 
as iron ore and aluminium, has led to the develop-
ment of a carbon intensive economy. Its economy 
is growing strongly, pulled along by the resource-
intensive growth of Asian economies. Australia is 
also extremely vulnerable to climate change, as 
has been demonstrated by severe droughts, floods 
and cyclones in recent years (Australian Govern-
ment, 2011a).
Australia is therefore one of the few developed 
countries at the forefront of the risks posed by cli-
mate change, yet reducing its emissions requires 
significant economic changes, leaving the govern-
ment with a difficult task of balancing the political 
economy of climate policy. The Australian Gov-
ernment’s solution is the Clean Energy Legislative 
Package (CELP). This paper addresses the central 
research question: how could the design of the 
CELP contribute to its political and social sustain-
ability, i.e. by improving its economic efficiency, 
assisting vulnerable constituencies and thus in-
creasing its public acceptability? It is structured as 
follows. Section 2 provides the context for the leg-
islation in terms of the structure of the Australian 
economy and energy sector and the political and 
social context during the package’s negotiation. 
1. Difference between figures and percentage due to 
rounding. In 1990, Australia’s emissions were 417.99291 
million tons CO2e, in 2010 542.69076 million tons CO2e, 
excluding the land-use sector.  
Section 3 summarizes the main political economy 
barriers to carbon pricing in Australia, and sketch-
es the Government’s measures to respond to these 
barriers. Section 4 then analyses in more detail the 
way the package is designed to overcome these 
barriers. Section 5 concludes with lessons for the 
design of climate policy.
2. THe coNTeXT for THe CLEAN 
ENERGY LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE 
2.1. The Australian economy 
and energy sector 
Although the performance of Australia’s economy 
should create a context conducive to the adoption 
of a carbon price, its composition presents some 
hurdles.
Historically, Australia has a strong, stable econ-
omy. Its real rate of GDP growth has averaged 
3.2% in the 20 years between 1991-2011, with just 
one year of recession (1991). Over the same period 
1991-2011, its unemployment rate has averaged 7%, 
and 5.4% since 2001. Per capita GDP was AUD 58.7 
thousand in 2011,2 35.3% above that of the United 
States and 65.2% above that of the Euro area at 
market prices (IMF data). Such solid economic 
performance should provide politicians with some 
breathing space to introduce a policy that is mod-
elled to marginally slow economic growth (Aus-
tralian Treasury, 2011). 
However, Australia’s resource endowments and 
geography have favoured the development of an 
export-driven, emissions intensive economy. In 
2. Many figures are given in this paper in AUD. For 
reference, in the 2011 calendar year, 1 AUD = 0.74 EUR 
and 1.04 USD.
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2009 the emissions intensity of Australia’s econo-
my was 0.56kg CO2/US dollar of GDP,3 putting it 
exactly on par with that of China, above that of the 
United States (0.46kg CO2/USD of GDP) and far 
above the European Union (EU) average (0.30kg 
CO2/USD of GDP). This difference is mainly due 
to the carbon intensity of Australia’s energy mix. 
Australia’s energy intensity is only 1.3% above the 
OECD average (IEA data).4 
In 2010, exports amounted to over 20% of Aus-
tralia’s GDP, giving the country a net trade surplus 
of AUD 16.8 billion. Geographically, Australia is 
relatively close to Asia and is specialized in the 
export of the primary resources demanded by the 
region’s rapid development. China is Australia’s 
largest export market, followed by Japan and 
South Korea. 70% of all Australian trade is with 
member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum (DFAT, 2011). Of Aus-
tralia’s exports in the year up to March 2011, 52.8% 
comprised minerals and fuels (Richardson and 
Denniss, 2011). In 2010, coal exports contributed 
AUD 43 billion to GDP, a figure topped only by ex-
ports of iron ore and concentrates worth AUD 49.4 
billion (DFAT, 2011). 
Coal dominates the Australian energy mix. In 
2011 it provided 34.7% of total primary energy sup-
ply compared to the OECD average of 20%, and 
69.3% of electricity supply compared with 34.3% 
in the OECD (IEA data). Such an abundance raw 
materials and a relatively cheap energy source 
has encouraged the development of energy and 
emissions intensive industries such as aluminium 
smelting, and iron and steel production. 
In recent years, mining in general has played a 
central role in the Australian economy. With the 
exclusion of the ownership of dwellings, the min-
ing sector is currently the fourth largest contribu-
tor to gross value added (GVA)5 (7.9%), sitting 
closely behind finance and insurance (10.4%), 
manufacturing (8.5%) and construction (8.4%) 
(ABS data). Sector contributions to GVA added are 
illustrated in Figure 1.6 
Although it is not the largest contributor to GVA, 
what is striking about the mining sector is its rapid 
growth. Between financial years 2001/2002 and 
2009/2010, mining GVA grew in nominal terms 
3. Using 2000 prices and purchasing power parity 
methodology (PPP).
4. Measured using PPP. 
5. Gross value added: monetary value of the goods and 
services produced, minus the costs of inputs attributable 
to that production. 
6. N.B. some sectors have been aggregated into larger 
groups such as “services”, or “public administration, 
education and health”. 
from AUD 33.8 billion (2001/2002 prices) to AUD 
96.1 billion (2009/2010 prices). This took its 
share in total GVA from 5.2% in 2001/2002 to 8% 
in 2009/10 (ABS, 2012 and ABS, 2003). Much of 
this nominal growth is due to booming prices over 
the previous decade, a structural shift that seems 
likely to be sustained despite the current global 
slowdown;7 deflated by sectoral prices (producer 
price index), the volume growth of the mining 
sector is much less significant. The current min-
ing boom allows mining groups to exert consider-
able influence in the public and political spheres 
(see Section 2.2.1.). This is despite the fact that it 
represents only about 2% of total direct employ-
ment, and that its strength has created exchange 
rate and inflationary pressures on the rest of the 
economy. These factors are not widely understood. 
According to a survey conducted by The Australia 
Institute in June 2011, the Australian public be-
lieves that the mining industry “employs nine 
times more workers than it actually does, accounts 
for three times as much economic activity as it ac-
tually does, [and] is 30 per cent more Australian-
owned than it actually is” (Richardson and Den-
niss, 2011: 54). 
In summary, the Australian economy is relative-
ly small, open and highly emissions intensive. As a 
result of the Asian boom and its own comparative 
advantages, Australia is increasingly specialized 
in emissions intensive, tradable sectors, although 
these sectors still represent a relatively small share 
of the overall economy and employment. How-
ever, such sectors form a highly organized, vocal 
constituency, and hence present a particular chal-
lenge to the political economy of climate policy 
(Victor, 2011). At the same time, Australia’s wealth 
and particular exposure to climate change should 
create a context conducive to action. This dichoto-
my of interests has created a highly fraught politi-
cal and social context for climate change policy in 
Australia. 
2.2. The political and 
social context 
This section draws on the political science litera-
ture to analyse the factors that may have been 
influential in establishing drivers and barriers to 
the development and adoption of the CELP. Many 
scholars have noted that policy outcomes may be 
affected by a series of political and social factors, 
7. We present the growth in mining in nominal terms based 
on the view that the price boom over the past decade has 
resulted from a structural break in supply and demand in 
key commodity sectors, and thus represents a sustained 
revaluation thereof. 
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including public preferences, partisan ideologies, 
and the electoral system. 
2.2.1. Public preferences 
Public preferences8 appear to have had an ambig-
uous impact on the passage of climate change 
legislation in Australia. Generally speaking, public 
prioritization of climate change appears to have 
been very high in 2006-2008 and to have then 
declined from roughly 2009 (Figure 2). 
The impact of public preferences on the policy 
process surrounding the CELP may be divided into 
four periods.
1. 200 to the federal election of November 200: In 
the lead-up to the 2007 federal election, Australians 
were more worried about climate change than any 
other global issue, and 74% were in favour of a 
carbon tax (Crowley, 2010). Thus during this first 
period, public preferences were central to pushing 
climate change into the Australian political debate, 
8. Public preferences can be defined as the aggregated 
priorities given by a community regarding different 
public goods and the public policies aimed at providing 
them. Therefore, collective preferences include the 
political support the community agrees to bring to each 
policy area.
and to making climate change a central issue in 
the federal election. The ruling Coalition9 was 
forced to change its long-held reticence to climate 
policy and carbon pricing; the two major parties 
(the centre-left Labour Party and the centre-right 
Liberal Party) both included a carbon-pricing 
scheme in their 2007 election platforms. The 
Labour Party won the federal election with a swing 
of 5.74% in what has been described as Australia’s 
first “climate change election” (Burgmann and 
Baer, 2012).  
2. November 200 to December 200: Strong 
collective preferences in favour of climate policy 
were insufficient to enable the government to 
pass climate change legislation, i.e. the Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS). The Labour 
Government tried to negotiate mainly with the 
centre-right Liberal Party, but the legislation failed 
to pass the Senate on two occasions. The five Green 
senators also refused to support the CPRS, despite 
the fact that it shared many essential elements 
with the current CELP, which the Green Party 
helped to pass (see below). Thus the failure to 
9. The Coalition of the centre-right Liberal Party, and the 
smaller centre-right National Party. 
 
Figure 1. Sectoral breakdown of Australian GVA, financial year 2010-2011 (AUD billion) 
 
Source : ABS data. 
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Figure 1. Sectoral breakdown of Australian GVA, financial year 2010- 2011 (AUD billion)
Source: ABS data
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establish a multi-party ownership of the legislative 
process appears to be a key factor for the failure 
of the CPRS. In November 2009, the centre-right 
opposition Liberal Party changed its leader to 
Tony Abbott, more reticent on climate policy, and 
withdrew its support for carbon pricing. Thus 
during the period November 2007 to December 
2009, the Government’s legislative strategy was 
pinned between the Green Party and the Liberal 
Party. The Green Party supported a highly 
ambitious policy while the Liberal Party was more 
reticent, to the point of changing its leader over, 
inter alia, this issue and subsequently withdrawing 
its support for carbon pricing in November 2009. 
3. December 200 to August 2010: Unable to force 
its passage, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd withdrew 
his climate change legislation in April 2010, 
which significantly damaged his credibility and 
contributed to his removal as leader of the Labour 
Party and hence Prime Minister in June 2010. 
Despite decreasing in intensity, public preferences 
nonetheless kept climate change on the political 
agenda in the lead-up to the August 2010 federal 
election and seem to have been expressed in 
the election results. Neither of the major parties 
took a carbon pricing policy to the August 2010 
federal election, and each received 72 seats in 
the House of Representatives, four short of the 
total needed to form a majority government. This 
created Australia’s first hung parliament at the 
federal level since 1940. However, the Australian 
Green Party experienced a swing of +3.97%, the 
strongest of any party, and received a seat in the 
House of Representatives for the first time. The 
Labour Party formed a minority government with 
the Green Party and three independent Members 
of Parliament (MP). The cooperation between 
the Green Party and the Labour Party was based 
on a formal agreement, which affirmed climate 
change policy as a central principle (Australian 
Labour Party and Australian Green Party, 
2010: 4). In addition, the agreement contained 
the creation of a Multi-Party Climate Change 
Committee (MPCCC),10 which subsequently 
negotiated the key elements of the package 
between the Labour Party, the Green Party and 
the Independents (Australian Government, 
2011b). This gave policy ownership to multiple 
parties, and was crucial to the development of 
some of the key elements of the CELP’s design, 
such as the extensive provisions for assisting low-
income households and earmarking revenues for 
10. The membership of the MPCCC was as follows: Julia 
Gillard (Labour Party, Australian Prime Minister); 
Wayne Swan (Labour Party, deputy Prime Minister 
and Treasurer); Greg Combet (Labour Party; Minister 
for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency); Christine 
Milne (Green Party, Senator); Bob Brown (Green Party, 
Senator); Tony Windsor (Independent Member of the 
House of Representatives); Rob Oakeshott (Independent 
Member of the House of Representatives). The following 
people were invited to assist the MPCCC: Mark Dreyfus 
(Labour Party, Member of the House of Representatives, 
Parliamentary Secretary for Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency); Adam Bandt (Green Party, Member of the 
House of Representatives). 
figure 2. Australian attitudes to domestic climate policy 2006-2012
Source: Lowy Institute, 2012
Global warming is a serious and pressing 
problem. We should begin taking steps now 
event if this involves significant costs.
The problem of global warming should be 
addressed, but its effects will be gradual, so 
we can deal with the problem gradually by 
taking steps that are low in cost.
Until we are sure that global warming is 
really a problem, we should not take any 
steps that would have economic costs.
Don’t know/Refused
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investment in renewables, energy efficiency and 
research and development (R&D). 
4. August 2010 to November 2011: the Australian 
Government was able to pass the CELP in 
November 2011 in the face of sharply eroding 
public preferences (see Figure 2). There seem to 
be several reasons for this decline, including the 
disappointing result at the Copenhagen climate 
conference in December 2009, the global financial 
crisis, and the breaking of the Millennium 
drought11 in Australia during 2009-2012. In 
addition, the increasingly contested partisan 
discourse on climate change after the accession of 
Tony Abbott to the leadership of the Liberal Party 
seems to have contributed to the erosion of public 
preferences (see Section 2.2.2. below). Relatedly, 
the Australian media appears to have played an 
important role. A study by the Australian Centre 
for Independent Journalism finds that, overall, 
negative media coverage of the carbon policy led 
by Julia Gillard’s Labour government—in power 
since the fall of Kevein Rudd in June 2010—
outweighed positive coverage across ten Australian 
newspapers by 73% to 27% (ACIJ, 2011). In 
particular, the apparent negative bias with respect 
to climate change and the market power of the 
dominant News Limited corporation was raised by 
several studies (ACIJ, 2011; Manne, 2011), and were 
cited as a motivating factor for the Government-
commissioned independent inquiry into media 
practices and regulation (Australian Government, 
2012a). Added to this negatively-skewed media 
coverage was an aggressive advertising campaign 
against the policy, funded by industry. Despite 
this unfavourable conjunction of elements, the 
government, dependent on the support of the 
single Green MP, was forced to retain climate 
change as a top priority, and was able to pass the 
CELP in November 2011, with the support of the 
Green Party and the three Independent MPs. 
In summary, public preferences appear to have 
played an important but ambiguous role in push-
ing climate change legislation forward. Public 
pressure made climate change a central electoral 
issue several times, and this public concern was 
expressed in election results (see Section 2.2.3 be-
low). Climate change policy was a key factor in the 
overthrow of two Prime Ministers (John Howard 
in the 2007 federal election; and Kevin Rudd in an 
internal party coup in June 2010), and one leader 
of the Opposition (Malcolm Turbull was replaced 
by Tony Abbott in November 2009). We now turn 
11. The so-called Millennium drought lasted from roughly 
1995 to 2009/12 and was the worst recorded since 
European settlement.  
to examine in more detail the role that the partisan 
positions may have played in shaping public pref-
erences on climate policy. 
2.2.2. Partisan positions 
There is a large literature on the role of elite opinion 
and the formation of public preferences (see in 
particular Zaller, 1992). The amount of informa-
tion and range of subjects requiring political judg-
ment exceeds most citizens’ capacity to engage 
intensively with the details of the public debate. 
Citizens therefore delegate much of their opinion-
formation to political elites, political journalists, 
and policy experts. The role of partisan discourses 
is important in this process of opinion delegation. 
Citizens operate under a system of partisan cues or 
stereotypes, which they use to evaluate informa-
tion and form opinions (Rahn 1993). This suggests 
a two-way relationship between public preferences 
and partisan positions, with each influencing the 
other. A large body of literature also shows that 
belief in and prioritization of climate change is 
highly correlated with ideological/political iden-
tifications, and that these can dominate other 
factors such as age, education, and social status 
(McCright and Dunlap, 2011). In broad terms, 
liberals or left-wingers tend to have a higher 
belief in and prioritization of climate change than 
conservatives or right-wingers.12  
As noted above, the Australian political debate 
around climate change became highly polarized 
in November 2009. The centre-right, opposition 
Liberal Party replaced its leader, Malcolm Turn-
bull, with the more climate-skeptic Tony Abbott, 
and withdrew from the bipartisan consensus on 
carbon pricing. The models of public opinion for-
mation presented above suggest that this would 
be associated with an increase in the polarization 
of public preferences as citizens gravitate toward 
the respective positions of the political parties 
with which they identify. Tranter (2011) showed 
that there was indeed a partisan polarization in 
the Australian electorate around climate change, 
which was already evident in 2007 data. Fielding 
et al. (2012) surveyed 311 Australian politicians in 
October 2009. Their results show that the centre-
left Green and Labour Party politicians had strong-
er beliefs in and higher prioritization of climate 
change than the centre-right Liberal or National 
Parties; gave more heuristic weight to scientists 
and environmental groups; and judged their own 
belief in and prioritization of climate change to be 
stronger than those of their electorate. Interest-
ingly, all political parties judged their own belief in 
12. The Australian Liberal Party is in fact a party of the 
centre-right. 
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and prioritization of climate change to be stronger 
than those of their electorate, although the per-
ceived gap narrowed toward the right of the politi-
cal spectrum. 
This suggests, firstly, that Australia’s politicians 
do perceive a leadership role for themselves, to the 
extent that their prioritization of climate change 
is perceived to exceed that of their electorate. 
Secondly, after the breakdown of the bipartisan 
consensus on carbon pricing in November 2009, it 
seems likely that the increasing polarization of the 
partisan discourse on climate change contributed 
to the erosion of public preferences for climate 
change policy (Figure 2). 
2.2.3. The Role of electoral rules 
Electoral rules shape the process by which public 
preferences are aggregated and translated into 
the power relations of government. They can 
thus potentially have a material impact on policy 
outcomes. 
Australia has a mixed electoral system with a 
first-past-the-post system (preferential voting) in 
the House of Representatives and proportional 
representation (single transferable vote) in the 
Senate. Preferential voting is a hybrid between 
proportional systems and majority systems. A can-
didate must secure an absolute majority of votes 
(i.e. above 50%) in order to be elected. Voters rank 
the candidates on the ballot paper in the order of 
their preference. If there is no absolute majority for 
a candidate in the first round, the candidates with 
the fewest votes are progressively excluded, and 
their votes are transferred to other candidates ac-
cording to voters’ preferences, until one candidate 
reaches the absolute majority (Australian Govern-
ment, 2008). Such an electoral rule exaggerates 
the share of seats for the major parties in order to 
produce a working parliamentary majority. At the 
same time, it allows two avenues for minor par-
ties to exercise political influence. First, before the 
election, the negotiation of preferences between 
parties gives an opportunity for minor parties to 
influence the platforms of major parties.13 Second, 
the allocation of preferences during the vote tally 
allows the minority views of the electorate to be 
expressed in the final result. In the case of the Au-
gust 2010 federal election, the latter avenue was 
vital, as we show below.  
Under proportional representation, parties win 
parliamentary seats roughly in proportion to the 
13. Each major party hands out “how to vote cards” on 
election day, which stipulate the preference order that 
voters for that party should use. These preference orders 
are often negotiated prior to the election between the 
parties. 
size of their vote. The proportional electoral mod-
el used in the Senate increases the chances of mi-
nor parties and independents winning seats and 
makes it difficult for a major party to gain control 
of the Senate. 
A recent comparative study of national climate 
policies finds that while majority systems dampen 
the expression of the strong environmental views 
held by a minority of voters, proportional systems 
exaggerate their impact when small green par-
ties play a critical role in parliamentary coalitions 
(Harrison & Sundstrom, 2010). Yet the relation-
ship between electoral systems and environmental 
policy outcomes may not be so straightforward. 
Another comparative study on carbon-energy tax-
ation rates in OECD countries suggests that under 
certain conditions, policy outcomes in some ma-
jority systems resemble those in proportional sys-
tems (Lachapelle, 2009). In situations where the 
seat vote elasticity is high,14 an increase in environ-
mental voting can create incentives for big politi-
cal parties to adopt stricter environmental policies, 
even if green parties never actually gain power. 
Between 2001 and 2010, the number of votes for 
the Australian Greens more than doubled in fed-
eral elections, and in 2010 the Green party won its 
first seat in the House of Representatives (Table 1). 
As noted above, the 2010 federal election produced 
a minority Labour Party government dependent 
on three Independents and one Green MP. Howev-
er, the Green MP, Adam Bandt, did not in fact win 
the primary vote in his seat. Table 2 below shows 
the results of the House of Representatives elec-
tion in the Division of Melbourne, which was vital 
to the Green Party’s role in the subsequent balance 
of power. It shows that the hybrid preferential sy-
etsm was vital to the election of the Green MP in 
the Division of Melbourne. 
Thus, the preferential system of the House of 
Representatives produced a similar policy outcome 
as a proportional system. That is, it magnified the 
role of “green” public preferences in the formation 
of government and hence in the development of 
policy. An important pre-condition for the Green 
Party holding the balance of power was the gener-
al discontent with both major parties, Labour and 
Liberal, which prevented either from forming a 
majority government. Although the ruling Labour 
Party experienced a swing of -5.70%, the Liberal 
Party experienced a swing of only +0.76% in the 
crucial federal election of August 2010. 
14. For example, in a situation where there are two closely 
matched major parties contesting a seat, any small shift 
in their vote could lead to the loss of the seat, and hence 
major parties will fight hard to gain votes and prevent 
losses. 
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2.2.4. Summary
The political and social factors identified above—
public preferences, partisan positions and elec-
toral rules—have had an ambiguous impact on the 
outcome of the Clean Energy Legislative Package, 
sometimes in contradiction with theoretical antici-
pations. While we would have expected the shift in 
public preferences to act as a barrier to the adop-
tion of carbon pricing, the Gillard government 
was ultimately able to pass the CELP in November 
2011. This suggests that politicians’ own ideals and 
preferences were necessary to the CELP’s positive 
outcome, even though they were confronted with 
adverse public preferences. Australia’s electoral 
rules also critically influenced the CELP outcome. 
By allowing for the negotiation of preferences 
between parties and the expression of minority pref-
erences, the first-past-the-post system in the House 
of Representatives enabled Green MP Adam Bandt 
to enter the House of Representatives. Holding the 
balance of power, the Green Party pushed for the 
development of carbon pricing and was crucial to 
its final adoption. This underscores the importance 
of bipartisan consensus and policy ownership for 
the development of sustainable climate policy 
(Giddens, 2008). In addition, the design of the 
package, in particular provisions for assisting low-
income households, were a key result of the multi-
party negotiations of the MPCCC. These elements 
are likely to be key to the policy’s social and political 
sustainability, and therefore gave politicians cover 
in pushing through the legislation despite deterio-
rating public preferences. It is to these elements of 
policy design that we now turn. 
3. suMMArIZINg THe poLITIcAL 
ecoNoMY bArrIers To cArboN 
prIcINg ANd THe AusTrALIAN 
ApproAcH IN respoNse 
Literature on and experience of environmental 
taxation15 is clear in stating that a significant 
impediment to its adoption is lack of public 
support (Gaunt et al., 2007; Kallbekken et al., 
2011). Although the public is not as organised as 
industry in exerting immediate influence upon 
the government, their voting power ultimately 
renders public opinion an important determinant 
of the sustainability of any policy (Kallbekken and 
Saelen, 2011). In turn, key reasons for low public 
support are: 
 m A strong mistrust in the government’s ability to 
use the revenue wisely and to achieve the poli-
cy’s intended environmental outcomes (Clinch 
et al., 2006; Kallbekken and Saelen, 2011).
 m A lack of understanding regarding the rationale 
for and the functioning of an environmental tax, 
or trading scheme (Clinch et al., 2006). In this re-
gard, more direct policies that target renewables 
or energy efficiency are often preferred by the 
public, even if their economic efficiency may be 
15. Such as a carbon tax, which is effectively what Australia 
will have until 2015. Furthermore, the Australian 
media has frequently been labelling the carbon pricing 
mechanism as such, which is why it is important to 
review the literature on public barriers to environmental 
taxation, and suggested mechanisms to overcome these 
barriers. 
Table 1. Evolution of voting for the Australian Greens in federal elections, House of Representatives, 2001-2010
Year Votes % swing (%) Number of seats
2001 569,075 4.96 +2.34 0
2004 841,734 7.19 +2.23 0
2007 967,789 7.79 +0.60 0
2010 1,458,998 11.76 +3.97 1
Source: Australian Electoral Commission, 2010
Table 2. Results of the House of Representatives election in the Division of Melbourne, 2010
count Adam bandt (green party) cath bowtell (Labour party) simon olsen (Liberal party)
Primary votes + 
preferences
% of total Primary votes + 
preferences
% of total Primary votes + 
preferences
% of total 
First 32 308 36.17 34 022 38.09 18 760 21.00
Second +173 36.36 +112 38.21 +97 21.11
Third +195 36.58 +153 38.38 +69 21.19
Fourth +695 37.36 +260 38.67 +363 21.59
Fifth +1 293 38.81 +435 39.16 +392 22.03
Sixth + 15 395 56.04 +4 286 43.96 EXCLUDED
TOTAL 50 059 56.04 39 268 43.96 19 681 22.03
ELECTED
Source: Australian Electoral Commission, 2010 
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lower than a policy framework including a car-
bon price (Brannlund and Persson, 2012).
 m Concern about the effects that the environ-
mental tax will have upon the economy (Milne, 
2008). In this regard, the emissions and trade 
intensive industries are a particularly powerful 
constituency (Victor, 2011). 
 m Concern about the regressive distributional 
impact of the scheme, and whether low-income 
households will be appropriately compensated 
(Kallbekken and Saelen, 2011).
 m The Labour government has embedded the Aus-
tralian carbon price in a wider set of policies 
aimed at addressing the barriers to public sup-
port elaborated above. These policies include 
the following: 
 m Earmarking significant revenues for renewable 
energy, energy efficiency and R&D in clean 
technologies.16 This combats lack of public trust 
in how the government will spend taxpayers’ 
money and in the ability of the policy to achieve 
its intended environmental goals.
 m The establishment of a strong, independent 
governance mechanism. This also aims to over-
come lack of public trust in the government, as 
well as attempting to shield the policy from the 
vagaries of the political cycle.
 m Free permit allocation to Australia’s emissions 
intensive, trade exposed industries, which 
shields them from the full brunt of the carbon 
price and gives them time to adopt lower emis-
sions production methods. This should help 
allay fears about the carbon price harming the 
economy and potentially vulnerable economic 
sectors. 
 m A reform of the income tax system and increased 
government assistance transfer payments. This 
combats regressive distributional impacts by 
increasing the real disposable income of low-
income households, and should improve the 
policy’s macroeconomic and labour market 
outcomes. 
In theory, these instruments should allow greater 
public scrutiny of the CELP (Brunner et al, 2011) 
and allay the public’s reservations towards it. In 
practice, however, the CELP’s design and rationale 
remain widely misunderstood. For example, the 
Ipsos Social Research Institute (2012) reported that 
16. These include the Clean Technology Program, the 
Clean Energy Finance Corporation, the establishment 
of the Australian Renewable Energy Agency, and the 
Biodiversity Fund. Details on these instruments and on 
the many additional instruments not listed here that 
form part of the Clean Energy Legislative Package can 
be found at http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/
clean-energy-future/programs-and-initiatives/ 
in November 2011, 53% of Australians surveyed 
somewhat or strongly believed that they would be 
worse off under the CELP, and only 16% did not 
think that they would be worse-off. By contrast, 
research by the Australian Treasury found that 
under the CELP average household costs will go up 
by AUD 9.90 a week, which would be more than 
offset by income tax cuts and increased transfer 
payments calculated to increase the income of 
the average household by AUD 10.10 per week 
(Australian Government, 2011a). It is therefore 
apparent that the government must, as Clinch 
et al. (2006: 969) argue, develop “a marketing 
strategy…in order to address the information 
asymmetries and lack of understanding”. Indeed, 
a report by the Climate Institute (2012) found that 
when the provisions for revenue recycling and 
investment in renewable energy are explained to 
the public, support increases significantly. More 
in-depth and widespread communication and 
explanation of the CELP will be crucial to its long-
term sustainability.
4. THe cLeAN eNergY 
LegIsLATIVe pAcKAge: desIgNINg 
susTAINAbLe poLIcY 
4.1. Governance between 
flexibility and certainty 
4.1.1. Designing the carbon price 
Designing a carbon pricing mechanism requires 
a delicate balance of certainty and flexibility. On 
the one hand, the carbon price must be credible 
in order to leverage the investments that actually 
reduce emissions. On the other hand, the carbon 
pricing mechanism also needs to be flexible enough 
to adapt to changing circumstances, such as 
macroeconomic and technological developments, 
changing scientific knowledge, and the progress of 
global negotiations (Brunner et al., 2011). 
Initially, the Australian carbon pricing 
mechanism essentially functions as a tax, which 
transitions to an emissions trading scheme (ETS) 
over a period of six years. From 1 July2012 to 30 June 
2015, unlimited permits are allocated to Australia’s 
500 biggest polluters at fixed prices, starting at 
AUD 23 and increasing in real terms by 2.5% per 
annum.17 In theory, this should give a period of 
17. Note that the carbon price will be imposed on pollution 
from the following sources: stationary energy, waste, 
rail transport, domestic aviation and shipping, industrial 
processes and fugitive emissions. Land use sectors 
such as agriculture are exempt, as are all forms of road 
transportation.
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stability and certainty, allowing businesses and 
government to learn about abatement supply and 
demand. In initial policy phases, theory suggests 
that a carbon tax should be more efficient, given 
the uncertainties that firms and governments are 
likely to face regarding abatement supply and 
demand.18 Whatever the theoretical justification, 
this so-called fixed price phase was an outcome of 
the political economy of the negotiation process in 
the MPCCC. The Labour Party and the Green Party 
could not agree on the ambition of Australia’s 2020 
emissions target, and hence opted for a fixed price 
and flexible means of setting subsequent targets. 
From 1 July 2015, the government will set 
emissions caps and price of permits will be allowed 
to fluctuate below a fixed price ceiling,19 which 
will be removed from 1 July 2018. The mechanism 
for setting pollution caps is designed to balance 
certainty and flexibility, as discussed above. In 
2014, the government will announce the pollution 
caps for the first five years of the flexible trading 
scheme, i.e. to 2019. Subsequently, in every given 
year x, the government will determine the cap for 
year x + 5, allowing firms to always know five years 
in advance the pollution caps that they will face. 
This would allow policy makers to adjust future 
quantities in response to macroeconomic events, 
technology developments or the progress of global 
negotiations. In theory, such a system could act like 
a “carbon monetary policy”,20 with policy makers 
adjusting future caps in response to changing 
circumstances in order to deliver pre-announced 
policy trajectories. Adjusting future quantities allows 
policy makers to manage long-term investment 
incentives, i.e. the real lever for decarbonization. 
Unlike monetary policy, however, the CELP does 
not delegate the power to set carbon caps to an 
independent authority, although the government 
will receive advice from the independent Climate 
Change Authority on this issue (see below).
18. Weitzman (1974) shows that regulation either by prices 
(tax) or quantities (cap and trade) may be preferable 
depending on uncertainty regarding the relative slope 
of the marginal abatement curve and marginal benefit 
curve. If the relative slope is steep, regulation by 
quantities is preferable, vice versa if it is shallow. In the 
short term, given that climate change is a global, long-
term pollution stock problem, the relative slope of the 
marginal benefit and marginal abatement cost curve 
is likely to be shallow, suggesting that price regulation 
would be most efficient under uncertainty. In the long 
term global perspective, the relative slope is likely to be 
steep, suggesting that quantity regulation would be most 
efficient under uncertainty. 
19. The fixed price ceiling is to be AUD 20 above the 
international price expected for 2015-2016, and will rise 
by 5% in real terms each year.
20. See Whitesell (2011) for a discussion of the parallels 
between carbon and monetary policy. 
In August 2012, the Australian Government 
reached a shared understanding with the European 
Commission on the linkage of the Australian scheme 
and the EU ETS. From 1 July 2015, a partial link 
with the EU ETS will begin. Australian businesses 
will be able to buy allowances from the EU ETS 
in order to meet up to 50% of their compliance 
obligations.21 This will pave the way for a full two-
way linkage in 2018 (European Commission and 
DCCEE, 28 August 2012). A key rationale for the 
linkage is to increase the political sustainability of 
the scheme, as it helps to undermine the argument 
that Australia is isolated in implementing carbon 
pricing. It is also a powerful “commitment device”, 
i.e. an “institutional [arrangement] that make[s] 
it a difficult and time-consuming process to 
change the policy rules” (Brunner et al., 2011: 3). 
However, EU experience has shown that linking 
ETS can reduce the flexibility of the policy, insofar 
as diverse governments must agree on any policy 
adjustments (Spencer and Fazekas, forthcoming). 
In this regard, it is not yet clear what the proposed 
linkage would mean for Australia’s innovative 
system of a rolling 5 year caps. In this instance, the 
government may have favoured increased policy 
certainty over flexibility, to the extent that the EU 
ETS linkage may increase the political and social 
sustainability of the scheme.  
4.1.2. The governance system
In an attempt to shield the carbon pricing mecha-
nism from the fluctuations of day-to-day politics, 
and to thus increase its credibility in the eyes of 
investors, the CELP creates a strong system of 
governance. 
The new system of governance allocates advi-
sory, administrative and reviewing roles to differ-
ent, independent statutory bodies. The Climate 
Change Authority (CCA) will give the government 
expert policy advice, for example on future pollu-
tion caps. The Clean Energy Regulator will admin-
istrate the regulatory aspects of the scheme. The 
highly respected Productivity Commission will re-
view specific, politically sensitive elements of the 
scheme, such as the risks of carbon leakage and 
the implementation of the Jobs and Competitive-
ness Program (see 4.2 below). Figure 3 summarises 
the roles of each of these independent bodies: 
Although ultimate policy control remains with 
the Australian Government, this governance struc-
ture insulates aspects of the administration and 
the review of the scheme from the political cycle. 
Furthermore, the CCA ensures that the govern-
ment is held publically accountable for its policy 
21. Until 2020, firms must meet at least 50% of their 
obligations using domestic permits.
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decisions. The CCA will publically report on the 
progress of the scheme and give recommenda-
tions for improvement. The review and reporting 
process must always involve public consultation, 
and if the government’s policy decisions (such as 
the setting of pollution caps) differ from the CCA’s 
recommendations, the government must publi-
cally justify its actions. This delegation of certain 
review and advice functions to independent au-
thorities should thus ensure greater continuity of 
Australia’s climate change policy across political 
cycles (Patay and Sartor, 2012).
4.2. Supporting emissions 
intensive, trade exposed 
industries and investing 
in clean technology 
As explained earlier in this paper, emissions inten-
sive, trade exposed industries play an important 
role in the Australian economy and form a well-
organized, vocal constituency that has consider-
able influence in politics. Addressing the risks 
of a loss of international competitiveness and of 
carbon leakage22 is therefore crucial to the political 
and economic sustainability of Australian climate 
policy. 
To this end, the CELP contains a number of 
programs that assist these industries by partially 
22. “Carbon leakage” refers to the phenomenon of emissions-
intensive industries relocating from countries with 
stringent climate policies to countries with less stringent 
policies, thereby hurting the economies of the countries 
with stringent climate policies and meaning that such 
policies do not have the intended effect of reducing 
global emissions.
shielding them from the carbon price whilst simul-
taneously providing targeted funding to assist the 
transformation to a low-emissions economy.
The Jobs and Competitiveness Program (JCP) 
spearheads industry assistance by allocating free 
carbon permits to eligible emissions intensive, 
trade exposed industries, the bulk of which are 
in the manufacturing sector (Australian Govern-
ment, 2011a). For free allocations, the emissions 
benchmark is determined by the industry average 
performance. The production benchmark is de-
termined based on each individual entity’s level 
of output in the previous year with a true up pe-
riod to take account of actual production, i.e. ef-
fectively an output based production benchmark 
(Australian Government, 2011a). During the fixed 
price period from 2012 to 2015 the government will 
buy back any unused freely allocated permits from 
eligible entities, preserving the opportunity cost 
of emissions and effectively transferring the car-
bon scarcity rent from the public budget to private 
firms. Table 3 presents the details of free alloca-
tions under the JPC and compares it to free alloca-
tion of permits in the EU ETS.
Assisting industry through the allocation of free 
permits can build industry support for the scheme, 
in turn increasing the scheme’s political sustain-
ability (Stavins, 2009). In theory, the environmen-
tal effectiveness of the scheme is not reduced by 
free permit allocation because businesses still face 
the same carbon price signal (Coase, 1960). That 
is, each permit has an opportunity cost, which 
firms should compare with their cost of reducing 
emissions. In practice, however, in the presence 
of behavioral biases and incomplete markets, free 
Figure 3. Governance structure of the Australian carbon pricing mechanism
Source: Australian Government, 2011a.
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allocation may negatively distort the environmen-
tal outcome of the scheme, as has been observed in 
the EU ETS (Abrell et al., 2011). 
It is partly for this reason that the Productivity 
Commission has been commissioned to review the 
assistance given under the JCP, and it will advise 
the government about whether the JCP needs to 
be amended to ensure that the program meets its 
objectives as efficiently as possible. 
The presence of multiple market failures, par-
ticularly with regard to innovation spillovers and 
capital market failures, may necessitate certain 
complementary measures to assist firms and in-
dustries with the transition to a low-emissions 
economy. To this end and also to provide further 
assistance, the JCP is supplemented by a number 
of further measures:
The Clean Technology Program comprises an 
AUD 1.2 billion grant program in energy efficiency, 
low-pollution capital investments, and R&D in key 
industries. This will be supplemented by industry 
co-financing. 
The Clean Energy Finance Corporation will invest 
in the commercialization and deployment of 
renewable energy, energy efficiency and low-
pollution technologies. It will operate with a 
commercial approach, leveraging private finance 
from an initial budgeted capitalization of AUD 945 
million for the period 2011-2015. 
In addition to these measures agreed by the 
MPCCC, the government has pledged to implement 
an AUD 300 million Steel Transformation Plan and 
an AUD 1.3 billion Coal Sector Jobs Package to 
reduce fugitive emissions from coal mines. 
For small business, the package contains a 30% 
increase in the instant asset write-off threshold, a 
tax break that will incentivize investments in new, 
presumably lower emissions capital stock. 
Finally, an Energy Security Fund worth 
AUD 5.5 billion in free permits and loans to finance 
the purchase of permits or cover debt refinancing 
in the event high emissions electricity generators 
are unable to finance themselves on capital 
markets.  
The total industry assistance package and ear-
marks for renewables, energy efficiency and R&D 
amount to about AUD 4 billion per year in the fis-
cal years 2011/2012 to 2014/2015, or 0.3% of 2011 
GDP.23 This seems well in excess of what would be 
needed to compensate the most exposed firms, 
and address other market failures through public 
investments in clean technology. 
23. This includes the following programs: support for jobs, 
the Clean Energy Finance Cooporation, energy security 
and transformation, land and biodiversity measures, 
and additional government measures not agreed by the 
MPCCC. See Australian Government 2011a, table 1, p. 131, 
and table 1, p. 135. 
Table 3. Free allocation methodology in the Australian ETS and the EU ETS
Australia (Jcp) eu eTs 
Eligibility criteria Trade intensity*: >10% 
Emissions intensity**: 
For first assistance tier: 
≥2000tCO2e/AUDm revenue or ≥6000tCO2e/AUDm value 
added 
For second assistance tier:
1000-1999tCO2e/AUDm revenue or 
3000-5999tCO2e/AUDm value added
Trade intensity and emissions intensity are measured using 
historical data from between 2004 and 2009.
Trade intensity: >10%; and
Cost exposure: direct and indirect additional costs 
induced by the EU ETS ≥ 5% of Gross Value Added
Alternative methodology: either criteria ≥30% 
Initial free allocation level First assistance tier: 94.5%
Second assistance tier: 66%
100% for sectors deemed at risk of carbon leakage 
80% for sectors not at risk 
Free allocation emissions 
baseline 
Based on industry average historical emissions per unit 
output in the given activity
Product based benchmarks based on 10% highest 
performing installations covered by the ETS in the 
given product category 
Free allocation production 
baseline 
Historical with annual updates and a true up period to 
account for actual production 
Historical production (2005-2008 or 2009-2010), 
not updated according to actual production. 
Free allocation evolution Free allocation declines by 1.3% per year (named the “carbon 
productivity contribution”)
Maintained at 100% for sectors at risk of carbon 
leakage 
Reduced linearly by 7.4% per year for sectors not at 
risk of carbon leakage (from 80% in 2013 to 30% 
in 2020)
Source: Australian Government (2011a) and European Commission.
* Ratio of value of imports and exports to value of domestic production; N.B. this is supplemented by a qualitative criteria, namely “…a demonstrated lack of capacity to 
pass through costs due to the potential for international competition” (Australian Government, 2011). 
**Emissions intensity = average emissions per million dollars of revenue, or emissions per million dollars of value added.
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4.. Supporting households 
As noted above, concerns about the regressive 
distributional impact of carbon pricing present an 
important barrier to public acceptance of such a 
policy (Kallbekken and Saelen, 2011). As a general 
rule, carbon pricing is indeed regressive, as poorer 
households spend a greater share of income on 
energy services. Rural residents, the unemployed 
and pensioners also represent particularly vulner-
able constituencies. Finally, low-income house-
holds may not have the capital to undertake energy 
and carbon efficiency investments. 
The importance of an equitable treatment of 
households was highlighted early in the process 
of developing the Labour Government’s climate 
policy (Garnaut, 2008). In his second 2011 report 
for the Gillard Labour government, advisor Ross 
Garnaut recommended integrating some of the 
recommendations of the Henry Tax Review, sub-
mitted to the Australian Government in May 2010 
(Australian Government, 2010). Consistent with 
the recommendations of the Henry Tax Review, 
Garnaut proposed a progressive tax shift from la-
bour to carbon consumption, via an increase in the 
tax-free threshold for income tax. There were at 
least three rationales for this proposal (Garnaut, 
2011): 
1) A labour-carbon tax shift would increase em-
ployment and labour force participation; 
2) And therefore increase economic growth rela-
tive to a simple carbon tax scenario; 
3) A progressive tax shift targeting low-income 
deciles could offset the regressive impacts of the 
carbon tax. 
The package adopted under the CELP increased 
the effective tax-free threshold from AUD 16,000 
to AUD 20,542 in 2012/2013, and to AUD 20,979 in 
2014/2015. Figure 4 shows the total level of the tax 
cut by income bracket over the period 2012-2015. 
In addition, the package includes increases in 
virtually all government benefits, such as pen-
sions, income support, family benefits, and sup-
port for students. This will be implemented in two 
stages: an upfront Clean Energy Advance before the 
legislation enters into force, and an annual, per-
manent, and tax-free increase thereafter, called 
the Clean Energy Supplement. These represent an 
increase in the maximum rate of most government 
benefits of 1.7%, which can be compared with the 
estimated inflationary impact of the scheme of 
a 0.7% increase in the Consumer Price Index in 
2012/2013. 
The fiscal impacts of these measures are sig-
nificant. In the three fiscal years 2012/2013 to 
2014/2015, progressive income tax cuts average 
AUD 2.68 billion per year, or 0.2% of 2011 GDP. In 
the four fiscal years 2011/2012 to 2014/2015, the in-
crease in government transfer payments averages 
AUD 1.72 billion per year, or 0.13% of 2011 GDP. Ta-
ble 4 shows the net fiscal impact of all measures to 
accompany the implementation of a carbon price. 
The total net negative fiscal impact of the CELP 
averages AUD 1.1 billion per year for the years 
2011/2012 to 2014/2015, or 0.08% of 2011 GDP.
The Australian carbon-pricing scheme has thus 
been tied to an ambitious fiscal reform, intended 
to reduce the regressive distributional impacts and 
increase the economic efficiency of the carbon 
price. The economic literature agrees that recy-
cling carbon revenues reduces the economic im-
pacts of carbon pricing (Hourcade et al., 2010). If 
used to reduce labour taxes, it can, under certain 
conditions, increase employment and national in-
come (Anderson, 2010). A progressive reduction of 
labour taxes for the lowest income brackets is esti-
mated to be most effective in creating employment 
and growth, as it has the highest marginal impact 
on after tax income. Lower-income deciles also 
have greater marginal utility gains to increased 
incomes, suggesting, other things equal, a higher 
income-employment elasticity for these income 
deciles. 
As shown in Table 4, the overall package has a 
negative net fiscal impact. This can be explained 
by the fact that the extremely fraught politics of 
carbon pricing seem to have pushed the govern-
ment to develop a very generous assistance pack-
age. The package likely exceeds what is strictly 
necessary in order to compensate the hardest-hit 
household segments and industries, and the policy 
of tax cuts and benefit increases may not be the 
most accurate method of targeting compensation. 
However, Australia is in a reasonably comfortable 
fiscal position, with a net government debt of 7.8% 
and a fiscal deficit of -4.3% of GDP in 2011 (IMF 
data, 2012). Australia thus has a fiscal room for 
maneuver, which other countries may not enjoy.
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Figure 4. Total income tax cut in AUD per income 
bracket, 2012-2015
Source: Australian Government, 2011c. 
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coNcLusIoNs ANd LessoNs LeArNed 
In November 2011, Australia adopted a compre-
hensive and innovative climate change policy, 
the Clean Energy Legislative Package. This paper 
has examined the approach taken by this legisla-
tion in order to overcome the significant political 
and social barriers to its adoption and retention in 
force. 
The key barriers can be described as follows. 
First, with the withdrawal of the centre-right Lib-
eral Party from the bipartisan consensus on carbon 
pricing in November 2009, the public discourse 
became highly partisan. This seems to have con-
tributed to a deterioration in public preferences 
for climate change policy. Second, the Australian 
economy is small, open and specialized in trad-
able, emissions intensive sectors. These sectors 
represent an important political lobby, and have 
contributed to the fraught public debate on cli-
mate change policy. Third, consistent with the 
literature on public perceptions of climate policy 
instruments, there has been a lack of public under-
standing for the rationale for carbon pricing, and 
a high level of public concern over its potentially 
regressive impacts.
Within this context, a number of factors appear 
to have been crucial to the adoption of the CELP. 
First, the Australian electoral system produced a 
highly unusual result in the August 2010 federal 
election, namely a hung parliament in which a 
single Green MP was crucial to the balance of 
power, along with three Independent MPs. In 
this regard, the hybrid system of preferential 
voting in the House of Representatives seems 
to have been crucial. The result, similar to con-
figurations more often produced by proportion-
al voting, was crucial to forcing climate change 
policy back to the centre of the minority Labour 
Government’s platform. Second, the CELP was 
developed on the basis of multi-party nego-
tiations under the auspices of the MPCCC. This 
allowed the entry of new ideas, such as the ex-
tensive household compensation package, and 
gave the Labour Party, the Green Party and the 
three Independents ownership over the package 
design and the subsequent legislative process. 
Third, the innovative and highly generous com-
pensation package in the legislation seems to 
have given Labour and Green politicians and the 
Independents some assurances of its longer-term 
public acceptability during the fraught adoption 
phase. 
The CELP embeds an innovative carbon pric-
ing mechanism in a broader package of policies, 
designed to ensure the social and political sus-
tainability of the policy and improve its economic 
efficiency. First, the package is combined with 
comprehensive fiscal reform. In the three fiscal 
years 2012/2013 to 2014/2015, progressive income 
tax cuts average AUD 2.68 billion per year, or 0.2% 
of 2011 GDP. In the four fiscal years 2011/2012 to 
2014/2015, the increase in government transfer 
payments averages AUD 1.72 billion per year, or 
0.13% of 2011 GDP. In theory, this should allay 
concerns about the potentially regressive impacts 
of the reform, and improve its macro-economic 
and labour market outcomes. It may also act as 
an important “commitment device”, making dis-
mantling the package more administratively and 
politically difficult. Second, the package contains 
a generous and comprehensive suite of measures 
to shield emissions intensive, trade exposed indus-
try, and facilitate the transition to a low-carbon 
economy by investing in R&D, renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and measures in the land sector. 
These amount to about AUD 4 billion per year in 
the fiscal years 2011/2012 to 2014/2015, or 0.3% 
Table 4. Total fiscal impacts of the Clean Energy Legislative Package, in million AUD
2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014 2014/2015
Total carbon price revenues 0 8,600 9,080 9,580
Assistance to Households -1,533 -4,196 -4,802 -4,825
Support for jobs -26 -3,017 -3,475 -3,773
Clean Energy Finance Corporation -2 -21 -467 -455
Energy security and transformation -1,009 -1 -1,003 -1,042
Land and biodiversity measures -69 -131 -506 -489
Governance -78 -90 -106 -107
Total assistance costs -2,717 -7,456 -10,359 -10,691
Additional measures not agreed by the MPCCC* -223 -48 -322  178
Net fiscal impact -2,939 1,096 -1,601 -933
Source: Australian Government (2011a) 
* These are the Coal Sector Jobs Package; Coal Mining Abatement Technology Support Package; Steel Transformation Plan, and the Additional fuel tax credit reductions for 
heavy on-road transport from 2014-15. 
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of 2011 GDP.24 The total net negative fiscal impact 
of the CELP averages AUD 1.1 billion per year for 
the years 2011/2012 to 2014/2015, or 0.08% of 
2011 GDP. Third, the package contains innovative 
governance mechanisms to hold the government 
accountable, shield the instruments from the po-
litical cycle, and increase the political costs of dis-
mantling the package. A key example thereof is the 
recent decision to link with the EU ETS. However, 
the Australian experience shows that even well de-
signed policy needs a careful and thorough public 
communication strategy in order to overcome se-
vere information asymmetries between the public 
and policy makers. 
The CELP represents an interesting case study 
for other countries looking to implement com-
prehensive climate change policies. The rel-
evant economic circumstances and social and 
24. This includes the following programs: support for jobs, 
the Clean Energy Finance Cooporation, energy security 
and transformation, land and biodiversity measures, 
and additional government measures not agreed by the 
MPCCC. See Australian Government 2011a, table 1, p. 131, 
and table 1, p. 135. 
political barriers are different in each country. 
Other countries can follow a similar principle of 
analyzing these ex ante and developing a com-
prehensive reform package to address them. Pro-
gressive cuts in labour taxation can potentially 
be win-win-win, addressing three objectives: im-
proving macroeconomic and labour market out-
comes, and addressing regressivity concerns. The 
Australian experience also underscores the cru-
cial importance of bipartisan ownership of policy 
development. Earmarking a significant share of 
carbon revenues for low-carbon energy, energy 
efficiency and R&D can help to overcome public 
concerns about the effective use of revenue, and 
address capital market failures and barriers to in-
novation. However, the future sustainability of 
the CELP is not assured. The centre-right Liberal 
Party has pledged to repeal it if it wins the next 
federal election, as seems likely. Nonetheless, the 
numerous measures discussed in this paper in-
crease the CELP’s chances of survival and provide 
an example of policy innovation for other coun-
tries to follow, keeping in mind their particular 
national circumstances. ❚
The political economy of Australia’s climate change and clean energy legislation: lessons learned
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